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ABSTRACT 
 
Who Benefits from KIPP?* 
 
The nation’s largest charter management organization is the Knowledge is Power Program 
(KIPP). KIPP schools are emblematic of the No Excuses approach to public education, a 
highly standardized and widely replicated charter model that features a long school day, an 
extended school year, selective teacher hiring, strict behavior norms, and a focus on 
traditional reading and math skills. No Excuses charter schools are sometimes said to focus 
on relatively motivated high achievers at the expense of students who are most diffiult to 
teach, including limited English proficiency (LEP) and special education (SPED) students, as 
well as students with low baseline achievement levels. We use applicant lotteries to evaluate 
the impact of KIPP Academy Lynn, a KIPP school in Lynn, Massachusetts that typifies the 
KIPP approach. Our analysis focuses on special needs students that may be underserved. 
The results show average achievement gains of 0.36 standard deviations in math and 0.12 
standard deviations in reading for each year spent at KIPP Lynn, with the largest gains 
coming from the LEP, SPED, and low-achievement groups. The average reading gains are 
driven almost completely by SPED and LEP students, whose reading scores rise by roughly 
0.35 standard deviations for each year spent at KIPP Lynn. 
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I. Introduction
The question of whether charter schools boost academic achievement, and what types of students
benefit most from charter attendance, remains controversial. This paper reports on an evaluation
of one of the most widely-replicated charter models, a school in the Knowledge is Power Program
(KIPP). KIPP is the nation’s largest charter management organization (CMO), a network of schools
that develops curricular materials, trains teachers and principals, and centralizes some administrative
functions. KIPP schools exhibit a large measure of program standardization maintained through
central and regional offices (Whitman, 2008). KIPP schools emphasize traditional math and reading
skills, the development of a strong student work ethic, strict behavior norms, long school days and
an extended school year. Ninety-nine KIPP schools serve 27,000 primarily low-income and minority
students in 20 states and the District of Columbia.
The question of KIPP’s effectiveness often arises in the debate over whether schools alone can
close achievement gaps between racial and income groups. In a study of the racial achievement gap
titled No Excuses, Thernstrom and Thernstrom (2003, p. 43) credit KIPP with impressive gains
among low-income students, and conclude that “truly radical education innovation can change the
lives of inner-city students, whatever their race or ethnicity.” Detractors argue that KIPP’s rigorous
requirements attract families whose children would succeed anyway: “KIPP students . . . enter
with substantially higher achievement than the typical achievement of schools from which they came.
...[T]eachers told us either that they referred students who were more able than their peers, or that
the most motivated and educationally sophisticated parents were those likely to take the initiative to
. . .enroll in KIPP (Carnoy, et al., 2005).” In this view, the positive results seen at KIPP schools
reflect selection bias.
Others have argued that while KIPP may be producing some gains, KIPP neglects students who are
most in need. Charter critics have voiced concern that charter schools do not serve these populations
and primarily benefit the most high-achieving and motivated students. For example, Rothstein (2004,
p. 82) writes about KIPP: “They select from the top of the ability distribution those lower-class
children with innate intelligence, well-motivated parents, or their own personal drives, and give these
children educations they can use to succeed in life.” In this view, KIPP is beneficial for students with
significant academic potential, but is less effective for lower-achieving groups. See also the discussion
in United Federation of Teachers (2010).
The causal effects reported here inform this debate. The setting for our study is KIPP Academy
Lynn, a middle school founded in 2004 in Lynn, Massachusetts. Our analysis focuses on the effect
of KIPP Lynn on students who are considered difficult to teach: those with low baseline test scores,
who have limited English proficiency, or are classified as special needs. KIPP Lynn is unusual among
charter schools in the it enrolls a high proportion of Hispanic, limited English proficient (LEP) and
special education (SPED) students, and so affords the opportunity to evaluate achievement gains for
these important subgroups.
KIPP Lynn has been substantially over-subscribed since 2005. As required of all over-subscribed
Massachusetts charter schools, KIPP Lynn uses a lottery to select incoming students. The KIPP
admissions lottery generates instrumental variables that we use to eliminate selection bias in estimates
of the causal effects of KIPP attendance. Although a burgeoning literature has used lotteries to
evaluate charter schools, as far as we know, ours is the first study to use lotteries to evaluate a KIPP
school.1 We therefore provide unusually strong evidence on the causal effect of attending KIPP.
Our results show average reading score gains of about 0.12 standard deviations (hereafter, σ) for
each year a student spends at KIPP, with significantly larger gains for special education and LEP
students of about 0.3-0.4σ. Students attending KIPP gain an average of 0.35σ per year in math; these
effects are slightly larger for LEP and special education students. We also produce separate estimates
for students with different levels of baseline (4th grade) scores. The result suggests that effects are
largest for those who start out behind their peers. Male and female students gain about equally
in math, while boys benefit more than girls in reading. Finally, an examination of Massachusetts
Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) performance categories (similar to quartiles) shows that
KIPP Lynn boosts achievement primarily by moving students up from the lowest group. Together,
therefore, the findings reported here suggest that KIPP Lynn benefits weak students the most.
We see the results for KIPP Lynn as revealing important possibilities. Although the conclusions
that can be drawn from an analysis of a single school are naturally limited, KIPP’s high degree of
standardization suggests that results for KIPP Lynn may be relevant for the broader population of
KIPP schools and students. As we describe further below, KIPP Lynn implements the key policies
that characterize the general KIPP model. KIPP started in Houston and New York and has only
recently expanded elsewhere (KIPP Lynn is the only KIPP school in New England). In an important
sense, therefore, our results help to answer the question of whether this model can be successfully
packaged and implemented at new locations. More tentatively, the results may extend to other “No
Excuses” schools (a term coined by Carter 2000 and Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2003) using central
elements of the KIPP model, including extended instructional hours, selective teacher hiring, strict
behavior norms, and a focus on traditional math and reading skills.
1A few studies have looked at overall effects of KIPP. See, for example, the studies linked at
http://www.kipp.org/01/independentreports.cfm. Hoxby and Murarka (2009), a lottery-based evaluation of charter
schools that includes some from KIPP in New York City, does not report KIPP results separately. Our recent AER
Papers and Proceedings article (Angrist, et al., 2010) presents a brief overview of some of the results reported here, but
does not explore the KIPP schooling model in depth or estimate effects among subgroups that have been at the heart of
the charter debate.
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The next section provides some background on KIPP schools and Lynn. Following that, Section
III describes the data and our lottery-based estimation framework. Section IV presents the results,
including estimates in the LEP and SPED subgroups and from models with baseline score interactions.
The paper concludes in Section V.
II. Background
A. The KIPP Context
KIPP was started in Houston and New York City in 1995 by veterans of Teach for America, a program
that recruits graduates of elite colleges to teach in low-performing districts (Mathews, 2009). The first
KIPP schools operated as alternative programs within traditional public school districts, with KIPP
staff employed by the district and covered by its seniority rules and salary schedules. In New York
City, KIPP staff were initially covered by the district’s collectively bargained union contract. In both
Houston and New York, the KIPP founders negotiated with district leadership for limited autonomy in
curriculum, staffing, and hours of instruction. This model – negotiated autonomy within a traditional
school district – is still followed by a few KIPP schools that operate under contract with a state
or district. Today, however, most KIPP schools are charters (Childress and Marino, 2008). KIPP
Houston became a charter school in 1998, and KIPP NYC did the same in 1999 (Leschly, 2008).
KIPP has expanded steadily, opening 97 schools in 20 states in 15 years. Most are middle schools,
covering grades five through eight. Recently, 15 KIPP high schools and 24 elementary schools have
been added to the network, usually attached to a pre-existing middle school. KIPP now serves 27,000
students, mostly low-income minorities who qualify for a free or reduced-price lunch. KIPP is currently
the nation’s largest CMO.
KIPP schools are characterized by a high level of standardization. The core set of KIPP policies
are laid out in an organizational slogan called the “Five Pillars:” High Expectations, Choice and
Commitment, More Time, Power to Lead, and Focus on Results.2 The “High Expectations” pillar
reflects KIPP’s focus on behavior and discipline. All KIPP students are expected to adhere to a
behavioral code which governs comportment within and between classes. KIPP schools use modest
financial incentives, distributed weekly, to reward effort and compliance with the code of conduct, as
well as completed homework and passing test scores. Paychecks in the form of “K dollars” can be
redeemed for items from a school store (notebooks, t-shirts, snacks). Recent experiments suggest that
short-term rewards of this form can improve student achievement (Fryer, 2010).
2See http://www.kipp.org/about-kipp, accessed April 4, 2011.
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The “Choice and Commitment” pillar receives particular emphasis. Enrollment at KIPP is vol-
untary, and students are expected to commit themselves fully to the KIPP model while they choose
to attend. This idea is encapsulated in a contract known as the KIPP “Commitment to Excellence.”
Parents or guardians, students, and teachers at all KIPP schools are asked to sign this contract, which
is a promise to come to school on time, work hard, and complete schoolwork, among other things.
As suggested by the third KIPP pillar, “More Time,” KIPP students spend extended time in
school, with both a longer school day and a longer academic year than traditional public schools.
Much of the additional time is used for instruction in basic math and reading skills. The “Power to
Lead” pillar reflects the ability of KIPP principals to respond to idiosyncratic needs at the school
level. This includes flexibility in budgetary and staffing decisions. For example, KIPP teachers are
typically non-union and employed outside whatever collective bargaining agreement may be in force
in the district where the school is located.3 To implement the fifth pillar, “Focus on Results,” KIPP
schools use frequent diagnostic standardized tests to measure student progress and identify areas for
improvement.
As the number of KIPP schools has grown, the founders have tried to develop and maintain the
KIPP brand while still allowing local schools a high degree of autonomy. The current KIPP organiza-
tion, which resembles a retail franchise, was developed with financial and logistical support from the
founders of The Gap, Inc. Central and regional offices train school principals, recruit teachers, and
provide operational support. KIPP schools pay a licensing fee to the central organization, amounting
to one percent of revenue in the first year of a school’s operation and three percent in subsequent
years (Leschly, 2003). KIPP retains the right to withdraw the use of its name if it determines that
a school is not meeting the network’s standards. Between 2001 and 2007, five KIPP schools closed,
while two left the KIPP network and continued to operate as independent charter schools (Childress
and Marino, 2008).
The KIPP Foundation bears many of the costs of starting a school, scouting out new locations and
training new principals. KIPP headquarters also provides operational support in the form of advice
on human resources management, legal issues, procurement and budgeting (Leschly, 2008). KIPP
principals receive a year of salaried training from KIPP. In 2002, there were 420 applicants for 20 slots
in the training program. Principals-in-training spend six weeks at the Haas School at Berkeley, trained
by instructors from the business schools at Berkeley and Stanford. They then shadow a principal at
an established KIPP school. The remainder of the year is spent preparing their new school. New
principals are coached and mentored in the first few years of operation (Leschly, 2003).
3There are a few exceptions. Teachers at a KIPP school in Baltimore are covered by a union contract. Three KIPP
schools in New York City have also been affiliated with unions at various times, though each subsequently voted to
decertify.
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B. KIPP Academy Lynn and the Lynn Public Schools
Lynn, Massachusetts is a city of 90,000 located ten miles northeast of Boston. The city was a manu-
facturing center from its earliest days, with footwear driving the economy until the nineteenth century,
when electrical manufacturing took center stage. General Electric’s Lynn plant built the country’s
first jet engines during World War II, and a GE plant is still located in the city. Even in its heyday,
the city had a colorful reputation. (A well-known New England ditty begins: “Lynn, Lynn, city of sin,
you never come out the way you came in.”) Crime rates in Lynn are among the highest in the state.
When manufacturing declined, poverty rose and income fell. The city’s 2007 poverty rate stood at 21
percent, more than twice the Massachusetts average.
Lynn Public Schools (LPS) enroll about 13,000 students a year in its nineteen elementary schools,
four middle schools and five high schools. KIPP Academy Lynn is the only charter school in the
city. About 1,600 children, or 11 percent of the school-age population, attend private schools in Lynn.
While the population of Lynn is more than two-thirds white, most of the 13,000 schoolchildren in the
city are nonwhite. Nearly 80 percent of Lynn’s students are eligible for a free or reduced-price lunch.
In 2009, all of the city’s public schools fell short of the achievement standards laid out in the federal
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) act. Middle school students in LPS are failing to meet state standards
for adequate yearly progress (AYP) in every subgroup tracked by NCLB. Fifth-grade students in LPS
score about a third of a standard deviation below the Massachusetts average on the MCAS, a fact
documented in the first column of Table 1, which reports scores of LPS students (relative to the state
average) along with other descriptive statistics.
KIPP Academy Lynn, which opened in the Fall of 2004, currently serves about 300 students in
grades five through eight. The state recently approved KIPP’s request to open a high school in
Lynn. KIPP Lynn is governed by a board drawn from the local community. The principal (“school
leader”) serves at the will of the board. None of the school staff are employed by the national KIPP
organization. As at other KIPP schools, the KIPP name is licensed from the national organization,
which can revoke the license if it considers the school out of compliance with KIPP goals and standards.
KIPP staff attend an annual national conference and participate in the teacher and principal training
programs provided by the national organization.
KIPP Lynn shares the core features of the KIPP model described above. It uses the “K dollars”
paycheck system to encourage academic effort and compliance with behavioral norms. Students’
paychecks serve to keep parents informed of a child’s behavior and progress, since a paycheck cannot
be cashed until a parent has signed it. The school’s 2003 application for charter notes: “While
students can earn up to K$50 each week, a minimum of K$35 on their paycheck tells a parent that the
student is meeting the minimum behavioral standards required by the school (KIPP Academy Lynn
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Charter School, 2003).” Parents, students, and teachers at KIPP Lynn sign the KIPP “Commitment
to Excellence.” In keeping with the “More Time” principle, KIPP Lynn has a very long school year,
starting in August and running on many Saturday mornings. The school day starts at 7:30 am and
ends at 5:00 pm. This works out to about 1,900 hours of instruction per year, as compared to about
1,250 in LPS. KIPP Lynn students are also encouraged to call teachers at night with questions about
homework.
Consistent with KIPP’s focus on measurable results, the school closely tracks students’ academic
performance. KIPP Lynn students take the Stanford 10, a widely used standardized test, each summer
before school starts. These tests are used to assess the curricular needs of a cohort and to plan
interventions for individual students. Student performance theroughout the year is discussed in staff
meetings. Students are also tested at the end of the year, again with the Stanford 10 (KIPP Academy
Lynn Charter School, 2003). The state of Massachusetts tests students in all grades covered by KIPP,
using the MCAS. Individual student MCAS scores are not immediately made available to schools,
however, which limits their usefulness for planning.
KIPP Lynn’s teachers are recruited through the national KIPP organization, which provides a
central clearinghouse for teachers interested in teaching at a KIPP school. Resumes are screened
and forwarded to KIPP Lynn, which interviews applicants by phone and invites finalists to teach a
sample lesson at the school. To fill five teaching slots at KIPP Lynn in 2007, the national organization
screened 5,000 resumes and asked 250 applicants to complete a detailed questionnaire. Forty applicants
were interviewed by phone and 25 invited to teach a sample lesson (Massachusetts Department of
Elementary and Secondary Education, 2008).
Similar to other KIPP schools, many KIPP Lynn teachers are graduates of Teach for America.
KIPP Lynn teachers are also much younger than their LPS colleagues: 88 percent are 40 or under,
compared to 29 percent in LPS. Perhaps reflecting their age, KIPP teachers are far less likely to
be licensed in their teaching assignment (26 percent, compared to 98 percent in LPS). While KIPP
Lynn teachers are younger and less likely to be licensed than LPS teachers, they are paid more (and
work longer hours): in 2008, average teacher salaries were $69,353 at KIPP Lynn and $60,523 in
LPS. The KIPP Lynn and LPS student-teacher ratios are similar, however (around 14), implying that
KIPP Lynn spends a higher proportion of its budget on instructional salaries than does LPS. The
school employs four full-time special education teachers, as well as a part-time, licensed ELL teacher.
Eight staff members are fluent in Spanish (Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary
Education, 2008).4
4Statistics in the paragraph are calculated from data available at http://profiles.doe.mass.edu, accessed January 28,
2010. MA charter school teacher salaries are available at http://finance1.doe.mass.edu/charter. Public school salaries
are at http://finance1.doe.mass.edu/statistics/.
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Like most other Massachusetts charter schools, KIPP Lynn is funded primarily through tuition
paid by students’ sending districts. Tuition is typically set to match sending districts’ average per-
pupil expenditure. This amount is offset by state subsidies to the sending district when a student first
transfers out of the regular public school district. KIPP Lynn spent about $11,500 per pupil in fiscal
year 2008, net of rental and capital costs that add another $2,000. KIPP Lynn is currently located
in a rented former church. KIPP Lynn receives about $11,000 per pupil from the town of Lynn,
with the remaining expenditures covered by donations and grants. Average per pupil expenditure in
LPS schools was about $13,000 in 2008. Like all new KIPP schools, KIPP Lynn received substantial
logistical support from the KIPP Foundation at startup.5 As at LPS schools, the state and LPS cover
busing costs for transportation-eligible students at KIPP.
Statewide regulations require that Massachusetts charter schools use a lottery when over-
subscribed. KIPP Lynn was under-subscribed when it opened in the Fall of 2004, and only marginally
over-subscribed in 2005. More recently, however, more than 200 students have applied for about 90
seats. The randomized lotteries allow us to estimate the causal effect of KIPP Lynn on the achievement
of applicants, solving the problem of selection bias that plagues most studies of school effectiveness.
Only Lynn residents can apply to KIPP Lynn. About three-quarters of KIPP applicants were attend-
ing a Lynn public school at the time of application; the balance presumably attended Lynn’s Catholic
schools or charter schools outside the city. KIPP Lynn applicants have (pre-lottery) math and reading
scores that are 0.39σ and 0.44σ below the state average, which is slightly lower than the LPS average
(Table 1). About a fifth of KIPP Lynn applicants are designated LEP, while a fifth are categorized
as special education students, similar to rates in the Lynn Public Schools.
C. Previous Research
Many studies try to assess the effect of schools on the achievement of low-income, nonwhite students.
As suggested by the concerns of Carnoy, et al., (2005), the key challenge in this literature is selection
bias: students at different types of schools likely differ in many ways, both observed and unobserved.
Catholic schools, which (like charter schools) have traditionally served a low-income, urban student
population, have received particularly intense scrutiny. Research on Catholic schools has followed
an arc similar to that on charter schools, with initial studies using statistical controls to control for
5KIPP Lynn financial statistics are from Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Ed-
ucation. 2009. “FY2008 Charter School End of Year Financial Report Summary.” Available at
http://finance1.doe.mass.edu/charter/08CSEOYFR Summary.xls, accessed May 3, 2010. LPS financial statistics are
from Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education. 2010. ”FY08 Expenditures Per Pupil, All
Funds, Summary By Function.” Available at http://finance1.doe.mass.edu/schfin/statistics/function08.xls, accessed May
3, 2010.
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selection (Coleman, 1966) and more recent research employing instrumental variables methods.6
Charter school evaluations that rely on statistical controls to deal with selection bias have produced
mixed results. A study using propensity score methods to match charter school students to similar
students in nearby traditional public schools concludes that charter schools are no better on average
than traditional public schools (CREDO 2009). A recent study of KIPP schools in the Bay Area,
which also used a propensity score approach, concluded that test scores are higher at KIPP but
cautioned that this may be driven by high exit rates by weaker students (Woodworth, et. al., 2008).
We will examine the rate at which KIPP admits switch schools, comparing it to the rate of school
switching among those who lose the KIPP lottery. This apples-to-apples comparison indicates that
KIPP students are no more likely to switch schools than other public school students.
The few charter evaluations that have used lotteries to identify causal effects report substantial
achievement gains. Lottery estimates for middle and high schools in Boston, many of which use the
No Excuses model, show test score gains on the order of 0.2 to 0.4 standard deviations for each year a
child spends in a charter school (Abdulkadirog˘lu, Angrist, Dynarski, Kane, and Pathak, forthcoming).
Hoxby and Murarka (2009) find smaller though still substantial effects from a more heterogeneous
sample of schools in New York City. A recent national study by Mathematica Policy Research used
the lottery approach to evaluate over-subscribed charter schools in several states (Gleason, et. al.,
2010). The study’s results for urban, high poverty charter schools are similar to those found in
Hoxby and Murarka (2009). Dobbie and Fryer (2009) use lottery data to examine two of the Harlem
Children’s Zone charter schools, with results similar to those we find here for KIPP. However, children
in the Harlem Children’s Zone receive a barrage of unusually intensive and expensive social services,
and the achievement effects may arise in part from these services.
III. Data
A. Admissions Lottery Data
Our sample of applicants is drawn from records of the four lotteries that took place at KIPP Academy
Lynn from 2005 through 2008. All charter schools in Massachusetts are required by state law to
conduct lotteries if they are over-subscribed. However, the lotteries are run by the individual schools,
and there is no centralized repository for the lottery data. KIPP staff graciously granted us full
access to the school’s paper and electronic lottery records. These records include applicants’ names,
date of birth, previous school and grade, and contact information for a parent, guardian or the name
of a sponsoring organization such as the Lynn Boys Club. These records were missing some key
6Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005a, 2005b) summarize and critique this literature.
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information. In particular, for some applicants, initial lottery status had been over-written with
enrollment status. In order to reconstruct the original lottery assignment, we conducted a detailed,
student-by-student review of applicant histories with school staff. As we show in the next section, our
reconstruction of the lottery data appears to have been successful.
From 2005, 629 students applied to KIPP Academy Lynn. The first five rows of Table A1
summarize the raw applicant data and subsequent restrictions made to the data. If a student applied to
KIPP Academy Lynn more than once, only the first application is included in the analysis. We exclude
late applicants (who applied after the lotteries), as well as sibling applicants (who are guaranteed entry)
and any students who went directly onto the waiting list (these are mostly 6th grade applicants in
early cohorts). A few students who repeated grades were listed in the lottery data to remind school
staff to reserve an appropriate number of slots, and these students are not included in the analysis
sample. Imposing these restrictions reduces the number of applicant records from 629 to 531. Lottery
records were used to reconstruct an indicator for whether applicants won the chance to attend KIPP
Lynn. Of the 531 applicants, 339 received an offer to attend KIPP Academy Lynn.
B. Attendance, Demographic and Test Score Data
We matched the 531 KIPP Lynn applicants to the Massachusetts Student Information Management
System (SIMS), a database with demographic and attendance information for all public school students
in the state. We use SIMS data from the 2001-2002 school year through the 2008-2009 school year.
The SIMS variables of interest include grade, year, name, town of residence, date of birth, sex, race,
special education (SPED) and limited English proficiency (LEP) status, subsidized lunch eligibility,
and school attended. The SIMS records capture data at multiple points within the school year. If
a student is classified as SPED, LEP, or qualified for free/reduced price lunch at any time within
a school-year-grade, then he or she is coded that way for the entire school-year-grade record. If we
observe a student attending KIPP at least once in a given academic year, we code her as attending
for the entire year.
Students in the lottery sample were matched to the SIMS data by name, pre-lottery grade, and
year.7 Our match rate is 95.3 percent among the 73 percent of applicants who were enrolled in the
Lynn Public Schools at the time of the lottery (Table A2). For this group, there is no statistically
distinguishable difference between the match rates for lottery winners (96.2 percent) and lottery losers
(93.4 percent). When we broaden the sample to include any students who were not previously enrolled
in the Lynn Public Schools, the match rate is 91 percent, and lottery winners are more likely to be
7In some cases, this did not produce a unique match, particularly when the lottery data were incomplete. We accepted
some matches based on fewer criteria where the information on grade, year, and town of residence seemed to make sense.
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matched to the SIMS than lottery losers (95.3 percent vs. 83.9 percent, respectively).8 To check
whether this differential match rate in the full sample biases our findings, we conduct a separate
analysis using only the subsample of LPS applicants. As we show later, we obtain effects very similar
to (but less precise than) those produced using the full sample. This suggests that the difference in
SIMS match rates between winners and losers does not bias our estimates.
The lottery/SIMS matched sample includes 484 applicants (Table A1). We drop students without
baseline (4th grade) demographics in the SIMS, as well as applicants who had completed 6th or 7th
grade prior to the lottery, leaving 446 students. In Massachusetts, third through eighth graders take
MCAS exams in math and English language arts (ELA), which we normalize to a statewide mean of
zero and standard deviation of one by subject, grade and year. We merge the KIPP applicants’ SIMS
records to the MCAS scores from Spring of 2006 through Spring 2009 using a state student identifier
(the SASID), excluding test scores taken by students during repeat grades. If all the applicants
maintained normal academic progress in Massachusetts public schools (and therefore took the MCAS)
we would expect to find 948 math scores and 948 ELA scores for our sample (Table A3). We find at
least one post-lottery test score for 96 percent of applicants scheduled to sit for the MCAS between
2006 and 2009 and 88 percent of expected scores (Table A3).9 As we show later in the analysis, there is
no statistical or substantive difference in the probability that we find MCAS scores for lottery winners
vs. losers.
C. The Matched Lottery Sample
Table 2 lists the lottery cohorts contributing to this study, the share of randomized applicants who
won entry to KIPP, and the share that attended. The number of applicants has risen over time, from
138 in 2005 to 207 in 2008 (Column 4). A total of 629 students applied to KIPP over this period. As
detailed in the previous section, 446 of these applicants are both subject to the randomized lottery
(e.g., their admission status is not pre-determined by the fact that they are sibling applicants or late
applicants) and matched to the state administrative datasets (Column 5). The likelihood of winning
admission to KIPP has gone down over time: the share offered a seat at KIPP Lynn dropped from
92.5 to 53.7 between 2005 and 2009 (Column 6). About half of those who apply end up attending
8This differential is likely driven by missing SIMS records for those who attend private schools when they apply to
KIPP (15 percent of middle-school students in Lynn attend private schools). KIPP staff informed us that many private
school applicants who apply to KIPP, but lose the lottery, choose to remain in their schools. Since private school students
do not appear in the SIMS, these students would not have a SIMS record.
9Among our 446 students in the matched SIMS/lottery data, 38 could not have sat for a post-lottery MCAS exam
between 2006 and 2009, due to the grade and year in which they applied to KIPP. We find at least one post-lottery score
for 390 of the remaining 408 students, a match rate of 96 percent. It is for these 408 students that we expect to observe
948 scores.
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KIPP (Column 7). These offer and attendance rates imply that about 80 percent (=52.5/67.9) of
those offered a seat at KIPP take up the offer; this take-up rate has been fairly stable over time.
The last column shows the average number of years spent by each cohort at KIPP Lynn between
2006 and 2009. Across the four cohorts, lottery winners spent an average of 1.85 years at KIPP Lynn
as of 2009 (last column of Table 2), but this varies by cohort. As of 2009, the 2008 cohort had spent
an average of just 0.7 years at KIPP, and taken just one MCAS exam, in 5th grade in 2009. By
contrast, the 2005 cohort had spent an average of 2.6 years at KIPP and had the opportunity to take
four MCAS exams (in 5th through 8th grade, in 2006 through 2009). Since we have the most outcome
data for the earliest admitted cohorts, the results in the paper should be interpreted as the effect of
a relatively new school on its first cohorts of students.
In Table 1, we provide descriptive statistics for the lottery sample (Column 3), including their
baseline (4th grade) test scores. To provide context, we also show statistics for all 5th grade students
who were enrolled in KIPP Lynn between 2006 and 2009 (Column 2), as well as for students enrolled
in 5th grade in Lynn Public Schools during the same period (Column 1). As noted earlier, Lynn’s
schools are heavily Hispanic (42 percent), Black (17 percent) and low-income (77 percent are eligible
for a subsidized lunch). These numbers are even higher for KIPP Lynn students: 57 percent Hispanic,
24 percent Black and 84 percent low-income. These data do not suggest that KIPP students and
applicants are positively selected from the Lynn Public Schools. In fact, on nearly every dimension,
they appear more disadvantaged than students attending the city’s traditional public schools. Lynn’s
test scores are about a third of a standard deviation below the state average, and those who apply
to and attend KIPP have even lower scores when they enter the school. This is typical of poor
urban school districts in Massachusetts.10 Importantly, large fractions of students both in the lottery
sample and in Lynn Public Schools are categorized as limited English proficient or special education;
roughly one fifth of applicants and one fifth of LPS students fall into each of these groups.11 In all of
the observable characteristics listed in the table, students in our lottery sample are quite similar to
students actually enrolled in KIPP.12
10Scores in Lynn are actually slightly higher than in the Boston Public Schools, where achievement lags behind the
state average by more than 0.7σ.
11The distributions of student disabilities are also similar among applicants and in LPS. In both groups, the largest
category is “specific learning disabilities,” which include reading deficits and dyslexia. 12 percent of applicants and 11
percent of LPS students have such disabilities. The remaining SPED students are scattered across a number of different
categories, including intellectual, emotional, and health-related disabilities.
12There is no reason to expect the two samples would be identical, since they are drawn from populations that differ
for two reasons. First, sibling admits (N=47) are included among the enrolled KIPP students but excluded from the
lottery sample. Second, students who are admitted to KIPP but do not attend (about 20 percent of admits) are included
in the lottery sample but excluded from the enrolled KIPP students. Sibling admits appear similar to those admitted
by lottery, with just two statistically significant differences: they are more likely to be poor (92 percent vs 83 percent)
and less likely to be black (13 percent vs. 26 percent).
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In a randomized lottery, any baseline differences between winners and losers should be small.
We test for balance between the lottery winners and losers in Table 1. Column 4 lists differences
in demographic characteristics and baseline scores between those who win and lose the KIPP Lynn
lottery. Note that all of these background characteristics are based on pre-lottery data. We take
care to use pre-lottery data because some variables may by affected by the school a student attends
(e.g., categorization as an English learner or special-education student, or signed up for subsidized
lunch). We obtain the estimates in Column 4 by regressing the listed characteristics against a dummy
indicating that a student was offered admission to KIPP Lynn, as well as a set of dummies indicating
year and grade of application (this is the same set of regressors we include in our 2SLS analysis,
discussed below). Differences in baseline scores are statistically indistinguishable from zero, as are all
but one of the differences in demographics (lottery winners are slightly more likely to be Asian). The
F-statistic from a joint test of balance on all observable characteristics produces a p-value of 0.615,
indicating that we are unable to reject the null that the means of all baseline characteristics are the
same for winners and losers. The small differences we observe in baseline scores shrink yet further
when we control for baseline demographics (Column 5), and the p-value on the F-test rises to 0.832.
While Table 1 shows that lottery winners and losers are similar at the time of the lottery, subsequent
attrition could produce imbalance in the follow-up sample if the attrition process is non-random. As
discussed above, we have merged the lottery data with administrative test score data from the state of
Massachusetts. Given the broad coverage of these data, the opportunities for students to atrit from our
sample are quite limited. In particular, a student can transfer between KIPP and any another public
school in the state without exiting our sample. Only those KIPP applicants who leave Massachusetts
or transfer into a private school are lost to follow-up. If those who lose the KIPP lottery are more
likely to attrit in this fashion, it could produce bias in our analyses. Selective attrition of this sort has
the potential to effectively undo the apples-to-apples nature of comparisons generated by the original
randomization.
Table 3 probes for evidence of differential attrition between lottery winners and losers. The outcome
of interest is a dummy variable indicating that a given KIPP Lynn applicant has a test score in the
dataset for a year and subject in which she was scheduled to be tested. We expect to observe 948
(post-lottery) test scores for students who participate in our applicant lotteries.13 We find 85 percent
of expected scores for those who lost the applicant lottery (Column 1). This is consistent with what
we would predict, given that 15 percent of middle-school students in Lynn attend private schools. For
lottery winners, the probability we find an expected score is five percentage points higher (Column 2).
This difference is not statistically significant, and it shrinks further when we add demographics and
13Appendix Table A3 lists the number of test scores expected and observed for each applicant cohort.
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baseline test scores to the estimating equation (Columns 3 and 4).
These small differences in attrition are extremely unlikely to explain the very large effects we find
in the paper. Assume that the post-lottery test scores of the “missing” lottery losers are a full standard
deviation higher than those of the lottery losers who remain in the sample – an extreme degree of
selection. In this scenario, differential attrition would explain 0.05σ of our estimated reduced-form
effects which, as we show below, are 0.16σ for reading and 0.43σ for math. For attrition to explain
these estimates, the test scores of the missing lottery losers would have to be three to nine standard
deviations higher than those of the lottery losers who remain in our data. Further, while we obviously
cannot examine outcomes for the missing students, we can compare their baseline scores with those of
students who remain in our sample. We find that, among those who win the lottery, baseline scores
do not differ by attrition status. Among those who lose the lottery, baseline scores are lower for those
who attrit than for those who remain in the sample. This suggests that, if anything, attrition tends
to work against our positive results, by pulling up the scores of lottery losers in our analytic sample.
D. 2SLS Strategy
We model the causal effect of KIPP Lynn attendance on test scores as a function of time spent
attending KIPP Lynn, using the equation:
yigt = αt + βg +
∑
j
δjdij + γ
′Xi + ρsigt + igt. (1)
Here, yigt denotes the scores of student i tested in year t in grade g. The variable sigt records calendar
years spent at KIPP Lynn as of the test date. If a student spends any time at KIPP in a given school
year, we count them as attending KIPP for that full year. This conservative assumption will tend
to drive down the magnitude of our 2SLS estimates. We include any repeated grades in our count of
years spent at KIPP. The (average) causal effect of interest is ρ. The terms αt and βg are year-of-test
and grade-of-test effects, while Xi is a vector of demographic controls with coefficient γ, and igt is an
error term that captures random fluctuation in test scores. The dummies dij indicate three of the four
KIPP Lynn application cohorts, indexed by j. Note that application cohort is an important control
variable because the probability of winning a seat at KIPP varies from year to year.14
We use randomly-assigned lottery offers as an instrument for sigt. Lottery offers are likely to
14All specifications include a dummy indicating whether an applicant’s sibling is in the lottery, as well as the interaction
of this dummy with year of application. Siblings who apply together are more likely to get in, since having a winning
sibling improves the losing sibling’s position on the wait list. Note that applicants with siblings already enrolled in
KIPP are excluded from the analysis sample, since such applicants are guaranteed admission. The applicants who are
non-lotteried siblings have similar observable characteristics to lotteried applicants.
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satisfy the two classical conditions for a valid instrument: They must affect the amount of time spent
at KIPP and be unrelated to unobserved factors that influence test scores. The first-stage equation
can be written:
sigt = λt + κg +
∑
j
µjdij + Γ
′Xi + piZi + ηigt, (2)
where λt and κg are year-of-test and grade effects. The excluded instrument is the lottery-offer dummy
Zi, with first-stage effect pi. Specifically, Zi indicates students offered a seat at KIPP Lynn sometime
between the lottery date for the relevant application cohort (usually in March) and the start of the
following school year. These offers were determined by randomly-assigned lottery-sequence numbers.
The reduced form generated by this two-equation system comes from substituting (2) for sigt in (1).
The reduced-form effect is the coefficient on Zi in a regression of yigt on Zi with the same controls
and data structure as for equations (1) and (2). Because the model is just identified, 2SLS estimates
of ρ are given by the ratio of reduced-form to first-stage coefficients.
IV. Results
We begin by examining the first stage, which is the effect of winning the lottery on the number of years
spent at KIPP Lynn. In a world with perfect lottery compliance, no late entry or grade repetition,
no loss to follow-up, and cohorts of equal size, the first stage in our sample would be 1.75.15 In fact,
the first stage is a little over 1.2 years (first column of Table 4). The interpretation of this estimate is
that, at the time they sat for each MCAS test, lottery winners had spent an average of 1.2 years more
at KIPP than lottery losers. The addition of demographic variables and baseline scores has almost no
effect on the estimate.16
Lottery winners score about 0.4 standard deviations higher than losers in math. This reduced-
form estimate is reported in column (2) in the top half of Table 4. This result is robust to the
inclusion of demographic controls and baseline scores. The reduced-form estimates for ELA, reported
in the bottom half of the table, are more variable across specifications, ranging from 0.12−0.18σ as
the set of controls varies. This variation probably reflects the modest imbalance between winners
and losers in the proportion LEP (documented in Table 1); we would expect LEP status to be more
15We make this calculation as follows. The 2005 cohort contributes one score after one year (in 5thgrade), one after
two years (in 6thgrade), one after three years (in 7thgrade), and one after four years (in 8thgrade) for an average of 2.5
years in KIPP across grades. A similar calculation for the other cohorts, who are seen in fewer grades, produces 2.0
potential years in KIPP for the 2006 cohort, 1.5 potential years in KIPP for the 2007 cohort, and one potential year in
KIPP for the 2008 cohort. The average of these is 1.75.
16We report separate first stages for math and ELA because samples differ slightly by subject, since subjects are tested
on different days.
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strongly correlated with ELA scores than with math scores. The estimated effect on ELA is marginally
significant in models with demographic and baseline score controls, which substantially increase the
precision of the estimates.
Because the first-stage coefficients are over one, the 2SLS estimates are smaller than the reduced-
form estimates, though they also have a different interpretation. The 2SLS estimates imply that math
scores increase by about 0.35σ for each year at KIPP Lynn.17 The more modest 2SLS estimates for
ELA show per-year gains on the order of 0.1 − 0.16σ. The most precise of these is 0.13σ, estimated
in models with demographic and baseline score controls (s.e.=0.058). These effects are remarkably
similar to the middle school results in Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (forthcoming), which come from a larger
sample of charter schools in Boston. Measured against Lynn’s Hispanic-White score gaps of about
0.5σ in math and 0.6σ in ELA, both the math and ELA effects are substantial. Perhaps surprisingly,
the OLS estimates of math effects reported in column (4) of Table 4 are close to the corresponding
2SLS estimates, though the OLS estimates of ELA effects are a little larger. The similarity of OLS
and 2SLS estimates (and the fact that the OLS estimates are insensitive to controls) suggests that in
the sample of KIPP Lynn applicants selection bias is minor.18
We noted above that the match rate from KIPP Lynn lottery records to SIMS data was almost
perfect among students who attended a Lynn public school at baseline. Also significant for our analysis,
baseline covariates are almost perfectly balanced across lottery status in this subsample. Therefore,
as a robustness check, we report results for the sample of applicants who attended an LPS school at
the time they applied. These estimates, shown in columns (5) and (6) of Table 4, are nearly identical
to the estimates obtained from the larger sample, but are slightly less precise. This set of results
bolsters our confidence that the full-sample results are not driven by differences in match rates or the
small differences in covariates between winners and losers that were detected in Table 1.
To provide a sense of whether the KIPP Lynn treatment effect has been increasing over time,
Figure 1 plots reduced-form estimates by cohort and grade. The plots start in fourth grade in order
to document any baseline differences.19 Not surprisingly, treatment effects estimated at this level of
disaggregation are fairly noisy and few are individually significant. On the other hand, the math
results appear to have increased somewhat for more recent applicant cohorts, while the evolution
17As noted by Angrist and Imbens (1995), if the effects of KIPP Lynn are nonlinear in years attended, our 2SLS
estimates can be interpreted as a weighted average of the effects of each year.
18We also experimented with an alternative IV model where the instrument is the grade- and cohort-specific potential
time in KIPP for winners. This is the first-stage specification used by Hoxby and Murarka (2009). The first stage in
this case indicates that each potential year in KIPP causes about 0.7 actual years in KIPP, as shown in column (4)
of Appendix Table A4. The corresponding 2SLS results, reported in column (6) of Table A4, are similar to the 2SLS
estimates reported in Table 4.
19The sample used to construct Figure 1 includes 4th grade applicants only. The reduced-form estimates plotted in
the figure come from models that include demographic controls. The estimates are reported in Table A5.
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through grades suggests a cumulative effect. Consistent with the smaller pooled estimates for ELA,
the ELA estimates in the plot are mostly smaller than the math estimates and take longer to emerge.
The math and ELA results both show an (insignificant) negative effect in 8th grade but this result
comes from a single cohort - KIPP Lynn’s second, admitted in 2005 - for which the first stage is also
relatively small. Overall, these figures suggest that KIPP Lynn’s achievement effects are cumulative
through grades and increasing across cohorts since the school first opened in 2004.
A. Variation in the Effect of KIPP across Subgroups
KIPP Lynn serves more LEP and special education students than the typical charter school in the
Northeast, and therefore offers a unique opportunity to look at the effects of charter attendance on
these important subgroups. The first four columns of Table 5 show that math gains are somewhat
larger for LEP and special education students than among other students. By contrast, reading gains
are markedly larger for students in these groups. In fact, the moderate reading gains found earlier in
Table 4 (0.12σ) appear to be driven almost entirely by very large gains among LEP students (roughly
0.4σ) and special education students (roughly 0.3σ).20
Table 5 also shows separate results for boys and girls. Nationwide, boys lag behind girls on
standardized tests, especially in reading and particularly among Blacks and Hispanics.21 Boys are
also more likely to be classified as needing special education services; among Massachusetts 4th graders,
23 percent of boys receive special education services, compared to 13 percent of girls. These gender
differences are similar for students at KIPP Lynn. Estimates by gender show math effects that are
about the same for boys and girls, as can be seen in columns (5) and (6) of Table 5. On the other
hand, consistent with the higher proportion of male special needs students and the results reported here
showing larger reading effects in the special education subgroup, the effect of KIPP Lynn attendance
on boys’ ELA scores is considerably larger than the effect for girls (0.15σ vs. 0.06σ in models with
baseline scores).
B. Effects by Baseline Achievement
As noted in the introduction, charter skeptics have argued that even if relatively motivated and able
students benefit from charter school attendance, weaker students lose out. If this depiction is accurate,
then we might expect KIPP to have benefits that are larger or perhaps even exclusively apparent for
those low-income children who are at the upper end of the distribution of academic ability. We explore
20Surprisingly, given the difference in effects by LEP status, we find that results are similar for Hispanics and non-
Hispanics (see Angrist, et al. 2010 for details).
21See Lee, Grigg and Donahue (2007) and Figure 3 in Mead (2006).
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this type of treatment effect heterogeneity by adding the interaction of baseline (4th grade) scores with
years spent at KIPP Lynn to our 2SLS model. The interaction terms are identified in these models
by adding an interaction between baseline scores and the lottery offer dummy variable (Zi in equation
2) to the list of excluded instruments. The interaction terms in these models are normalized so
that the main effect of years spent at KIPP reflects the impact of time in KIPP evaluated at the
mean of the baseline score distribution. The results of estimation with interaction terms, reported
in columns (7-8) of Table 5, suggest that KIPP Lynn raises achievement more for weaker students.
Specifically, the reading results indicate that children with baseline reading scores half a standard
deviation below the KIPP applicant mean get an additional reading boost of about 0.08σ (=-0.5 *
-0.167) from each year spent at KIPP, compared to a student whose baseline scores are at the mean.
This translates into annual reading gains of 0.16σ per year for the average child at KIPP Lynn (who
enters with reading scores 0.4σ below the Massachusetts mean) and annual gains of 0.24σ for a child
entering half a standard deviation behind her KIPP classmates (that is, 0.9σ below the Massachusetts
mean). Students who enter with the weakest math scores also see a larger math achievement gain
from their time at KIPP. The typical KIPP Lynn student experiences math gains of 0.38σ per year,
while a student who starts out half a standard deviation behind her KIPP peers realizes annual gains
of 0.43σ.
We also looked at the impact of KIPP attendance on the distribution of students across the
MCAS proficiency categories that Massachusetts uses to determine whether schools are meeting the
AYP standards laid out in federal NCLB legislation. Massachusetts classifies raw MCAS scores in
four mutually exclusive categories: Advanced, Proficient, Needs Improvement, and Warning. Under
current NCLB provisions, a school is designated as meeting the AYP standard if the school’s average
score, as well as the average score among various subgroups, falls into the Proficient or Advanced
categories. MCAS categories therefore give a simple and policy-relevant picture of the effects of KIPP
attendance on the distribution of MCAS scores.
The first row of Table 6 shows the effect of a year spent at KIPP Lynn on the probability a
student’s score lands him or her in one of the four MCAS categories for math scores. Each year at
KIPP is estimated to reduce the probability of falling into the Warning category by ten percentage
points, while the probability of performing at an Advanced level rises by ten percentage points. There
are no detectable effects in the middle categories. This pattern most likely reflects an across-the-
board rightward shift in the distribution of math achievement (since few students are likely to jump
all the way from the lowest to the highest category). In contrast, the ELA results show about a 6
point movement away from the Warning group into the Needs Improvement category, with no other
change. While the score gains generated by KIPP Lynn are clearly broader for math than for ELA,
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it’s noteworthy that achievement gains in both subjects reflect a shift out of the lowest group.
This conclusion is reinforced by Panel B of Table 6, which reports effects estimated separately
for students from each quartile of the baseline (fourth-grade) score distribution in our sample. The
estimates in Panel B show positive and significant effects in all baseline score quartiles for math. In
contrast, the only significant ELA effect is for students with the lowest baseline scores. The results in
this section show that KIPP Lynn raises the achievement of minority students who start from a very
low baseline (the fourth grade scores of KIPP applicants in the lowest baseline quartile are roughly
one standard deviation below the Massachusetts average). The results are therefore quite relevant to
policy-makers interested in reducing achievement gaps.
C. Are the Results Driven by School Switching?
Can the positive effects reported here be explained by high rates of exit from KIPP? This question
is motivated in part by evidence that KIPP schools in the San Francisco area experience high rates
of exit, though it is not clear whether these rates are out of line with those in the host public school
districts (Woodworth, et al., 2008). It’s worth noting in this context that our lottery-based estimation
procedure focuses on score differences between winners and losers (i.e., the reduced form effect of
winning the lottery) without regard to whether the winners remain in KIPP. Movements out of KIPP
by lottery winners therefore reduce the lottery first stage, while leaving the causal interpretation of the
IV estimates uncompromised even if the weakest or least motivated KIPP students switch out. On
the other hand, if the score gains generated by KIPP come in part from a small but highly motivated
group that remains in the school after winning the lottery, while weaker or less-motivated students
wash out, selective switching may have a beneficial peer effect that augments effects for those who
remain. High exit rates from KIPP might also limit the external validity of our estimates for a broader
and perhaps less motivated population.
Our school switching analysis uses the same empirical framework as that used to investigate attri-
tion in Table 3, but the dependent variable in this case indicates whether a KIPP applicant changed
schools between grades five and eight. These results, reported in the first column of Table 7, show that
KIPP Lynn lottery winners were much less likely to change schools than those who lost the lottery.
As can be seen in column (2), this difference (and the overall high mean switch rate) can be explained
by the fact that KIPP Lynn students stay at KIPP in the transition from 5th to 6th grade, when LPS
students move from elementary to middle school. Excluding the transition from 5th to 6th grade, the
results show no difference in switching between lottery winners and losers, as can be seen in the last
column of Table 7. This implies that KIPP students are no more likely to change middle schools
than their LPS peers (in this case, the mean switch rate for both groups is only about 0.08).
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V. Concluding Comments
KIPP is a large and growing charter management organization that exemplifies the No Excuses ap-
proach to public education. The lottery-based estimates reported here suggest that New England’s
only KIPP school - KIPP Lynn - has generated substantial score gains for KIPP students, especially
those with limited English proficiency, low baseline scores, or in special education. Reading gains are
realized almost exclusively by special education and limited English proficiency students. Male and
female students appear to have experienced similar achievement gains in math, but reading gains are
much stronger for boys. Finally, an analysis of effects on MCAS performance categories shows that
KIPP lifts students out of the lowest performance category in both math and ELA. These results
suggest that the lowest achievers benefit the most from KIPP attendance. A recent charter study
concludes that newly opened charter schools do worse than traditional public schools, with effects
that tend to improve as schools age (Zimmer, et al., 2009). It’s therefore worth noting that the results
reported here are from the first few cohorts to attend KIPP Lynn.
A natural question in this context is how general the lessons learned from a single school can be.
Every school has unique features and charter schools are especially diverse, ranging from the highly
structured and in many ways quite traditional school environment typical of KIPP to Ohio’s virtual
charter schools using technology to deliver education to students in their homes. We see the experiences
of KIPP Lynn not as definitive for charters as a whole, but rather as revealing important possibilities.
Because KIPP Lynn implements the key policies of the highly standardized KIPP model, the estimates
reported here are likely to be informative about the effects of KIPP schools at other locations. Our
findings suggest the major elements of this replicable schooling model produce substantial achievement
gains overall, and especially large gains for relatively weak students and those with special needs.
The results for KIPP Lynn are also relevant to the debate over the proper balance between in-
vestment in schools and other community services in policies designed to reduce achievement gaps.
A premise of the U.S. Department of Education’s recent Promise Neighborhoods Initiative is that
achievement gains are more likely when school reform is combined with social, educational, and health
support for children from birth to college. An influential proponent of this community-based reform
effort is Canada (2010). Others, however, have argued that, at least as far as achievement goes,
schools alone may be enough (Curto, Fryer, and Howard, 2010; Dobbie and Fryer, 2009; Whitehurst
and Croft, 2010). Our results are consistent with this latter view since KIPP Lynn students receive
non-school services typical of those received by children in any urban district.
Would we expect to see similar gains were all schools to adopt the KIPP model? Our estimates
show that KIPP has heterogeneous effects, and may have little impact on middle-class children, or on
those whose parents are college educated. Moreover, our estimates are relevant for the set of students
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who apply to KIPP; effects may be different for students not interested in attending. The general
equilibrium effects of KIPP might also differ from partial equilibrium estimates. In particular, the
supply of principals and teachers who can execute the KIPP model may be limited. Indeed, KIPP
cites the supply of trained principals and teachers as a constraint on growth (Childress and Marino,
2007). To loosen this constraint, KIPP New York has partnered with the Teacher YOU program at
Hunter College to design a teacher preparation program that leads to certification and a masters’
degree in education (Childress and Marino, 2007). It remains to be seen, however, whether new KIPP
schools will be as successful as the one studied here.
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Lynn Public 5th 
graders
KIPP Lynn 5th 
graders
KIPP Lynn lottery 
applicants
No controls
Demographic 
controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hispanic 0.418 0.565 0.538 -0.052 -
(0.053)
Black 0.173 0.235 0.256 0.033 -
(0.044)
White 0.296 0.168 0.179 -0.017 -
(0.040)
Asian 0.108 0.021 0.022 0.028* -
(0.015)
Female 0.480 0.474 0.489 -0.002 -
(0.054)
Free/reduced price lunch 0.770 0.842 0.825 -0.031 -
(0.041)
Special Education 0.185 0.189 0.200 -0.009 -
(0.043)
Limited English Proficiency 0.221 0.172 0.206 -0.074
(0.047)
Baseline Math Score -0.307 -0.336 -0.389 0.097 0.034
(0.114) (0.107)
Baseline Verbal Score -0.356 -0.399 -0.443 0.039 -0.036
(0.119) (0.105)
F-value from joint test 0.814 0.184
p-value from F-test 0.615 0.832
N for demographics 3964 285 446 446 446
N for baseline Math 3808 284 435 435 435
N for baseline ELA 3805 284 436 436 436
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics and Covariate Balance
Notes:  Columns (1), (2), and (3) report means of the variable indicated in each row. Column (1) reports 4th grade means for students that 
attended 5th grade in Lynn public schools in Fall 2005-2008.  Column (2) reports 4th grade means for all students who attended KIPP 
Academy Lynn in these years, and column (3) reports 4th grade means for lottery applicants to KIPP Academy Lynn over the same period.  
The sample for columns (3)-(5) is restricted to randomized applicants with baseline demographics and excludes students who had 
completed 6th or 7th grade prior to applying.  Column (4) reports coefficients from regressions of the variable indicated in each row on an 
indicator variable equal to one if the student won the lottery. These regressions include dummies for year of application and application 
grade and exclude students with sibling priority and those without baseline demographics.  Column (5) adds all of the demographic controls 
to the regressions for baseline scores. F-tests are for the null hypothesis that the coefficients on winning the lottery in all regressions are 
equal to zero. These tests statistics are calculated for the subsample that has non-missing values for all variables tested.
Means Balance regressions
Lottery Cohort
Calendar years 
observed Grades observed
Number of 
applicants
Number of 
applicants in lottery 
sample Percent offered Percent attended
Average years at 
KAL (winners)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2005-2006 2006-2009 5-8 138 106 0.925 0.670 2.56
2006-2007 2007-2009 5-7 117 86 0.674 0.535 2.29
2007-2008 2008-2009 5-6 167 118 0.627 0.534 1.68
2008-2009 2009 5 207 136 0.537 0.397 0.70
All cohorts 2006-2009 5-8 629 446 0.679 0.525 1.85
Table 2:  KIPP Academy Lynn Lotteries
Notes:  This table reports characteristics of the four lotteries conducted at KIPP Academy Lynn from 2005 to 2008.  Column (2) reports the calendar years (Spring) in 
which test scores are observed for applicants in each lottery cohort, and column (3) reports the corresponding outcome grades.  Column (4) gives the total number of 
applicants in each year, and column (5) gives the number of applicants in the lottery sample, which excludes sibling applicants, late applicants, repeat applicants, 
applicants without baseline demographics, applicants who could not be matched to the MCAS data, and applicants who had completed 6th or 7th grade prior to the lottery.  
Columns (6)-(8) give summary statistics for the lottery sample.
Proportion of non-offered 
with MCAS scores
Basic controls Demographics
Demographics and 
baseline scores
Subject (1) (2) (3) (4)
Math 0.851 0.050 0.035 0.039
(0.032) (0.031) (0.030)
948 948 934
ELA 0.855 0.041 0.025 0.036
(0.033) (0.032) (0.031)
948 948 935
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Differential follow-up (winner - loser)
Table 3:  Attrition
Notes:   Column (1) reports the fraction of test scores found for non-offered students.  Columns (2)-(4) report coefficients from 
regressions of an indicator variable equal to one if the outcome test score is non-missing on an indicator variable equal to one if the 
student won the lottery. Grades are pooled, and all regressions include grade dummies.  The regression in column (2) includes 
dummies for outcome grade, year of baseline, application grade, and year of application interacted with a contemporaneous sibling 
applicant dummy.  Column (3) adds demographic variables, and column (4) adds baseline test scores.  Samples are restricted to 
cohorts for which we should observe follow-up scores.  Robust standard errors (clustered at the student level) are reported in 
parentheses.
First Stage Reduced Form 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS
Subject Controls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Basic 1.218*** 0.437*** 0.359*** 0.301*** 0.352*** 0.304***
(0.065) (0.117) (0.096) (0.048) (0.110) (0.054)
842 842 842 842 683 683
Demographics 1.225*** 0.399*** 0.325*** 0.312*** 0.324*** 0.332***
(0.067) (0.106) (0.084) (0.041) (0.099) (0.046)
842 842 842 842 683 683
1.221*** 0.430*** 0.352*** 0.314*** 0.352*** 0.344***
(0.068) (0.067) (0.053) (0.032) (0.064) (0.038)
833 833 833 833 675 675
ELA Basic 1.218*** 0.189 0.155 0.169*** 0.224* 0.166***
(0.065) (0.118) (0.096) (0.049) (0.115) (0.057)
843 843 843 843 684 684
Demographics 1.228*** 0.124 0.101 0.170*** 0.159* 0.179***
(0.068) (0.098) (0.078) (0.041) (0.092) (0.046)
843 843 843 843 684 684
1.228*** 0.164** 0.133** 0.174*** 0.150** 0.185***
(0.068) (0.073) (0.059) (0.031) (0.069) (0.036)
833 833 833 833 677 677
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Lynn public schools at baseline
Notes:   This table reports the coefficients from regressions of test scores on years spent at KIPP Academy Lynn. The sample uses students who 
applied to KIPP Lynn between 2005 and 2008.  It is restricted to students with baseline demographic characteristics and excludes applicants with 
sibling priority. Grades are pooled, and all regressions include grade dummies.  All regressions also include year of test dummies, year of 
application dummies interacted with a contemporaneous sibling applicant dummy, and grade of application dummies.  Some regressions add 
demographic controls, which include dummies for female, black, hispanic, asian, other race, special education, limited english proficiency, 
free/reduced price lunch, and a female*minority interaction.  Columns (1)-(3) report the first stage, reduced form, and 2SLS coefficients from 
instrumenting years in KIPP Lynn using the lottery win/loss dummy.  Column (4) reports the coefficients from OLS regressions of test scores on 
years in KIPP Lynn and controls.  Columns (5) and (6) report 2SLS and OLS results using only students that indicated Lynn Public School 
attendance prior to the lottery on their KIPP Lynn applications.  Robust standard errors (clustered at the student level) are reported in 
parentheses.
Table 4:  Lottery Results
all applicants
Demographics & 
Baseline Scores
Demographics & 
Baseline Scores
LEP Non-LEP SPED Non-SPED Male Female Main effect Interaction term
Subject Controls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Math Demographics 0.618*** 0.266*** 0.459** 0.285*** 0.344*** 0.276** - -
(0.205) (0.093) (0.207) (0.088) (0.112) (0.126)
128 714 173 669 427 415
0.466*** 0.314*** 0.419*** 0.330*** 0.336*** 0.381*** 0.375*** -0.111***
(0.155) (0.057) (0.146) (0.053) (0.072) (0.080) (0.054) (0.041)
127 706 172 661 422 411
ELA Demographics 0.441** 0.022 0.155 0.048 0.158 -0.003 - -
(0.189) (0.085) (0.199) (0.079) (0.105) (0.115)
127 716 174 669 425 418
0.428*** 0.061 0.268* 0.063 0.177** 0.056 0.155*** -0.167***
(0.141) (0.063) (0.156) (0.059) (0.080) (0.087) (0.057) (0.044)
126 707 172 661 419 414
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5:  Subgroups and Interactions
Notes:  Columns (1)-(4) report 2SLS estimates in subsets of the lottery sample.  The sample for each regression is restricted to individuals who were classified as limited english proficient (LEP), 
special education (SPED), or male in columns (1), (3), and (5), compared to those who were not in columns (2), (4), and (6) respectively.   The LEP estimation sample includes 79  students, while 
the non-LEP sample includes 319.  The SPED estimation sample includes 78 students, while the non-SPED sample includes 320.  The male estimation sample includes 205 students, while the 
female sample includes 196.  Columns (7) and (8) report results from models interacting baseline test score with years at KIPP Academy Lynn.  Main effects are at the mean.  The interaction models 
are estimated by including the offer dummy interacted with baseline score as a second instrument.  Robust standard errors (clustered at the student level) are reported in parentheses.
Demographics and Baseline 
Scores
Demographics and Baseline 
Scores
Baseline Score Interaction
833
833
Effects by Subgroup
Lowest Group Second Lowest Second Highest Highest Group
Subject (1) (2) (3) (4)
Math -0.100*** -0.019 0.016 0.103***
(0.028) (0.038) (0.039) (0.026)
Fraction in category 0.183 0.319 0.335 0.162
N
ELA -0.055*** 0.068* -0.005 -0.003
(0.020) (0.037) (0.037) (0.017)
Fraction in category 0.084 0.350 0.500 0.065
N
Math effect 0.515*** 0.434*** 0.453*** 0.216***
(0.185) (0.106) (0.100) (0.054)
Mean score by quartile -0.943 -0.133 0.218 0.755
N 210 216 199 208
ELA effect 0.499*** 0.066 0.049 -0.081
(0.148) (0.120) (0.090) (0.074)
Mean score by quartile -1.127 -0.383 0.012 0.474
N 210 208 209 206
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes:  Panel A reports coefficients from 2SLS regressions of indicator variables for each of the 4 MCAS 
performance levels on years in KIPP Lynn instrumented by the lottery offer dummy.  Panel B reports 
2SLS estimates of test score effects by baseline score quartile (defined by the distribution of 4th grade 
scores in our sample).  Regressions are run separately for each quartile.  Grades are stacked.  Controls 
include demographics and baseline scores.  Robust standard errors (clustered at the student level) are 
reported in parentheses.
Table 6:  Distribution Effects
Panel A.  Effects on MCAS Performance Categories
Panel B.  Effects by Baseline Score Quartile
856
856
Any switch
6th grade school is 
different from 5th
Any switch excluding 
5th-6th transition
Controls (1) (2) (3)
Demographics -0.298*** -0.513*** -0.009
(0.044) (0.061) (0.033)
Mean loser switch rate 0.504 0.855 0.081
408 284 408
-0.302*** -0.518*** -0.007
(0.045) (0.059) (0.034)
Mean loser switch rate 0.513 0.853 0.084
401 281 401
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 7:  School Switching Regressions
Notes:   This table reports coefficients from regressions of an indicator variable equal to one if a student 
switched schools on an indicator variable equal to one if the student won the KIPP Academy Lynn lottery. 
The dependent variable in column (1) is 1 if a student ever moves from one observed school to another 
from 5th to 8th grade, either within a school year or between school years.  The dependent variable in 
column (2) is 1 if a student switches schools between 5th and 6th grade; only observations where both 
schools are observed are used.  The dependent variable in column (3) is 1 if a student switches schools at 
any time besides the transition from 5th to 6th grade.  The sample is restricted to cohorts for which we 
should observe follow-up test scores and excludes applicants with sibling priority.  Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses.
Differential (winner - loser)
Demographics and Baseline 
Scores
Figure 1
A.  Math Reduced Form
B. ELA Reduced Form
Notes:  This figure plots the coefficients from a regression of test scores on the lottery 
offer dummy interacted with dummies for grade of test*application year.  Basic and 
demographic controls are included.  Sample restricted to 4th grade applicants.
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Data Appendix
Data for this project come from KIPP Academy Lynn lottery records, student demographic and school
attendance information in the Massachusetts Student Information Management System (SIMS), and
test scores from the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) state database. This
appendix describes these data sets and details the procedures used to clean and match them.
A. Data Sets
KIPP Academy Lynn Lottery Data
Data description and sample restrictions
Our sample of applicants is drawn from records of the four lotteries that took place at KIPP
Academy Lynn from 2005 through 2008. These records include applicants’ names, date of birth,
previous school and grade, and contact information for a parent, guardian, or the name of a sponsoring
organization such as the Lynn Boys Club. The first five rows of Table A1 summarize the raw lottery
data and sample restrictions used here. A few students who repeated grades were listed in the lottery
data to remind school staff to reserve an appropriate number of slots. These records are not included
in the analysis sample. We also excluded duplicate records. If a student applied to KIPP Academy
Lynn more than once, only the first application is included. Late applicants (after lotteries) were
excluded as were siblings and students who went directly onto the waiting list (these are mostly 6th
grade applicants in early cohorts). Imposing these restrictions reduces the number of lottery records
from 629 to 531.
Coding lottery offers
Lottery records were used to reconstruct an indicator for whether applicants won the chance to
attend KIPP Lynn through the lottery process. We coded this from information on whether each
student attended KIPP Lynn in the year after the lottery, attempts to contact lottery winners, and
offers that were declined. Attempts to contact winners and declined offers were not always recorded;
we filled this in by reviewing each applicant record with school staff. Of the 531 randomized applicants
in our lottery sample, 339 were coded as receiving offers.
Student Information Management System Data
Data description
This project uses SIMS data from the 2001-2002 school year through the 2008-2009 school year.
Each year of data includes an October file and an end-of-year file. The SIMS records demographic and
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attendance information for all Massachusetts public school students. SIMS records refer to a student
in a school in a year, though there are some student-school-year duplicates for students that switch
grades or programs within a school and year.
Coding of demographics and attendance
The SIMS variables of interest include grade, year, name, town of residence, date of birth, sex,
race, special education (SPED) and limited English proficiency (LEP) status, subsidized lunch eli-
gibility, and school attended. We constructed a wide-format data set that captures each student’s
demographic information for each grade in which he or she is present in the SIMS data. This file uses
the demographic information from the longest-attended school in the first calendar year encountered
for each grade. Attendance ties were broken at random (this affects only 0.014 percent of records). If
a student is classified as SPED, LEP, or qualified for free/reduced price lunch in any record within a
school-year-grade, then he or she is coded that way for the entire school-year-grade record.
KIPP Lynn attendance is measured in calendar years. A student was coded as attending KIPP
Lynn when there is any SIMS record for KIPP attendance in that year. Our analysis uses grade of
application as determined by the SIMS (as some parents record this incorrectly on lottery applications).
Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System Data
Data description and sample restrictions
This project uses MCAS data from the 2001-2002 school year through the 2008-2009 school year.
Each record in the MCAS data corresponds to a student’s test results for a given grade and year. We
use Math and English Language Arts (ELA) tests from grades 4-8. Our outcome grades are 5-8, so
only tests taken in 2006-2007 or later are used for these grades; prior years give baseline (4th grade)
scores. We standardized scores to have mean zero and standard deviation one within a subject-grade-
year in Massachusetts. Repetitions of the same test subject and grade were dropped. In one case with
multiple records within a year and grade, scores were chosen at random.
B. Matching Data Sets
Match from the MCAS to the SIMS
The cleaned MCAS and SIMS files were merged by grade, year and a state student identifier known
as the SASID. In grades 4-8, 99.3 percent of MCAS scores were matched to a student in the SIMS.
Scores that could not be matched to the SIMS were dropped.
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Match from the KIPP Academy Lynn lotteries to the SIMS/MCAS
Match procedure
Students in the lottery sample were matched to the SIMS data by name, pre-lottery grade, and
year. In some cases, this did not produce a unique match, most often in cases where the lottery data
were incomplete. We accepted some matches based on fewer criteria where the information on grade,
year, and town of residence seemed to make sense.
Match success rates
Table A2 reports match rates from lottery records to the SIMS/MCAS file. The overall match rate
is 91.1 percent (484 students out of 531). The match rate for offered students is 95.3 percent, while
it is 83.9 percent for students who did not receive an offer. The differential is much lower for lottery
applicants coming from an LPS school; the match rates for the offered and non-offered students in this
subgroup are 96.2 percent and 93.4 percent, respectively. The differentials quoted in the text come
from regressions of a match dummy on application year and LPS status (or just application year in
the sample coming from LPS).
Construction of the Outcome Data Set
The lottery/SIMS/MCAS matched sample includes 484 lottery applicants with demographic and test
score information. Of these, we use only students with baseline (4th grade) demographics in the
SIMS. We also exclude 10 applicants who had completed 6th or 7th grade prior to the lottery, leaving
a sample of 446 students. This is the sample of students used for the calculations reported in Table
2. Rows 6-8 of Table A1 summarize the impact of these restrictions on sample size.
Stacking grades
Outcome regressions stack grades and include multiple test scores for individual students. The
follow-up window closes in Spring 2009, generating differences in the number of outcomes observed
across lottery cohorts. For example, a 4th grade applicant for the 2005-2006 school year contributes
5th grade through 8th grade scores, whereas we see 5th grade only for 2008 applicants.
Outcomes excluded from the sample
KIPP Lynn typically asked 5th grade applicants to repeat. These applicants might be expected
to do better on 5th grade MCAS tests just by virtue of repeating. We therefore assume that all 5th
grade applicants repeat and look only at their 6th grade and higher scores. We also drop a few 3rd
grade applicants. These restrictions reduce the sample to 408, eliminating 31 2008-9 applicants from
5th grade (and a handful from 3rd).
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Final set of outcomes and students
Table A3 summarizes the stacked analysis file. Of the 948 post-lottery outcomes we could hope to
observe for each subject, we found 842 for Math and 843 for ELA; 390 of our 408 remaining students
have at least one test score. These outcomes and students were used to produce the estimates in Table
4. For specifications that control for baseline test scores, the sample sizes are further reduced to 833
outcomes for both Math and ELA; four students out of 390 lack baseline Math and ELA scores.
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2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 All lotteries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total number of records 138 117 167 207 629
Excluding KIPP students and duplicates within year 138 117 162 205 622
Excluding repeat applicants 138 115 158 196 607
Excluding late/non-randomized applicants 127 110 155 194 586
Excluding siblings 121 102 134 174 531
Excluding students not matched to the SIMS 114 95 122 153 484
Excluding students without baseline demographics 109 86 118 143 456
Excluding 6th and 7th grade applicants 106 86 118 136 446
Excluding applicants who should not have a test score 106 86 118 98 408
Table A.1:  KIPP Academy Lynn Lottery Records
Notes:  This table summarizes the raw KIPP Academy Lynn lottery data.  The top row gives the total number of records, and each successive 
row adds sample restrictions.  The second row eliminates KIPP Lynn students who repeat grades and are listed in the lottery data as 
placeholders, as well as duplicate student records within a lottery year.  The third row keeps only the first lottery year in which a given student 
applies, and the fourth row excludes late (post-lottery) applicants as well as other non-randomized applicants.  The fifth row eliminates students 
with sibling priority.  The sixth row eliminates students who cannot be matched to the SIMS database.  The seventh row excludes students 
without baseline (4th grade) demographics.  The seventh row excludes students who had completed 6th or 7th grade prior to the lottery.  The 
eighth row excludes students who should not have a non-repeat test score based on application grade and cohort (which eliminates 3rd and 5th 
grade applicants in 2008).
Lottery cohort
Number of 
students Total Offered Not offered
Number of 
students Total Offered Not offered
Lottery cohort (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2005-2006 121 0.942 0.954 0.833 102 0.971 0.968 1.000
2006-2007 102 0.931 0.971 0.848 76 0.934 0.963 0.864
2007-2008 134 0.910 0.950 0.852 92 0.957 0.967 0.935
2008-2009 174 0.879 0.938 0.828 116 0.948 0.946 0.950
All cohorts 531 0.911 0.953 0.839 386 0.953 0.962 0.934
Fraction with SIMS match Fraction with SIMS match
Table A.2:  Match from KIPP Academy Lynn lottery data to SIMS
Notes:  This table summarizes the match from the KIPP Academy Lynn lottery data to the SIMS.  The sample excludes repeat 
applicants, late applicants, and siblings.  Columns (1)-(4) report statistics for all other applicants, and columns (5)-(8) report statistics 
for students whose previous schools in the KAL lottery data are part of the Lynn Public School system.
All applicants Applicants from Lynn Public Schools
Number of 
students
Number with an 
observed test score
Number of test 
scores expected 
Math test scores 
observed
ELA test scores 
observed
Lottery cohort (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2005-2006 106 104 401 353 357
2006-2007 86 84 238 212 211
2007-2008 118 113 211 188 186
2008-2009 98 89 98 89 89
All cohorts 408 390 948 842 843
Table A.3:  Outcome data for KIPP Academy Lynn Applicants
Notes:  This table summarizes observed test score outcomes for KIPP Academy Lynn applicants.  The sample 
is restricted to randomized applicants who are matched to baseline (4th grade) SIMS demographics and who 
should have at least one test score.  6th and 7th grade applicants are excluded.  Column (2) reports the number 
of students for whom at least one outcome is observed.  Column (3) gives the number of test scores that should 
be observed (for both Math and ELA) given each applicant's lottery cohort and application grade.  Columns (4) 
and (5) report the numbers of Math and ELA outcomes that are observed in the data.
First Stage Reduced Form 2SLS First Stage Reduced Form 2SLS
Subject Controls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Basic 1.218*** 0.437*** 0.359*** 0.681*** 0.209*** 0.308***
(0.065) (0.117) (0.096) (0.040) (0.064) (0.089)
842 842 842 842 842 842
Demographics 1.225*** 0.399*** 0.325*** 0.683*** 0.188*** 0.275***
(0.067) (0.106) (0.084) (0.040) (0.057) (0.078)
842 842 842 842 842 842
1.221*** 0.430*** 0.352*** 0.684*** 0.235*** 0.343***
(0.068) (0.067) (0.053) (0.040) (0.038) (0.052)
833 833 833 833 833 833
ELA Basic 1.218*** 0.189 0.155 0.682*** 0.084 0.123
(0.065) (0.118) (0.096) (0.039) (0.060) (0.087)
843 843 843 843 843 843
Demographics 1.228*** 0.124 0.101 0.685*** 0.053 0.077
(0.068) (0.098) (0.078) (0.040) (0.048) (0.067)
843 843 843 843 843 843
1.228*** 0.164** 0.133** 0.686*** 0.097** 0.142***
(0.068) (0.073) (0.059) (0.040) (0.038) (0.054)
833 833 833 833 833 833
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Alternative instrument
Notes:   This table reports instrumental variables results similar to those in Table 4.  It is restricted to students with baseline demographic characteristics and excludes 
applicants with sibling priority. Grades are pooled, and all regressions include grade dummies. Columns (1)-(3) report the first stage, reduced form, and 2SLS 
coefficients from instrumenting years in KIPP Lynn with the lottery offer dummy as in Table 4.  Columns (4)-(6) report results using potential years in KIPP Lynn 
interacted with the offer dummy as the instrument.  Potential years in KIPP Lynn is calculated as the number of years a student would accumulate by attending KIPP 
Lynn in each post-lottery year until the outcome grade without repeating (except for 5th grade applicants, who are assumed to repeat one grade).  Robust standard 
errors (clustered at the student level) are reported in parentheses.
Table A.4:  Alternative Instruments
Offer instrument
Demographics & Baseline 
Scores
Demographics & Baseline 
Scores
Subject Test Grade
2005 
Cohort
2006 
Cohort
2007 
Cohort
2008 
Cohort
All 
Cohorts
Math 4th -0.358 -0.083 0.355 0.119 0.137
(0.241) (0.256) (0.227) (0.187) (0.120)
83 65 101 97 346
5th -0.328 0.118 0.728*** 0.293 0.336***
(0.242) (0.228) (0.229) (0.182) (0.119)
83 65 95 90 333
6th -0.106 0.320 1.002*** - 0.607***
(0.219) (0.259) (0.218) (0.153)
79 61 86 226
7th -0.241* 0.718*** - - 0.653***
(0.146) (0.231) (0.200)
77 54 131
8th -0.140 - - - -0.124
(0.160) (0.151)
62 62
ELA 4th -0.155 0.077 0.194 0.113 0.125
(0.224) (0.202) (0.212) (0.198) (0.112)
83 65 101 98 347
5th -0.361 -0.002 0.247 0.234 0.136
(0.173) (0.213) (0.242) (0.193) (0.119)
82 64 93 90 329
6th -0.148 0.040 0.237 - 0.128
(0.300) (0.237) (0.223) (0.142)
80 61 86 227
7th -0.046 0.611*** - - 0.517***
(0.156) (0.206) (0.177)
78 54 132
8th -0.219 - - - -0.209
(0.223) (0.227)
63 63
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table A.5:  Reduced Forms by Grade and Cohort
Notes:  This table reports coefficients from regressing test scores on a full set 
of application cohort*test grade dummies interacted with the lottery offer 
dummy.  The "all cohorts" coefficients are produced from regressions 
interacting grade dummies with the lottery offer dummy.  Basic and 
demographic controls are included in all regressions.  Sample is restricted to 
4th grade applicants.  Standard errors are clustered at the student level.
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